

IAWG COUNTRY STUDIES: SOUTH AFRICA

Foreword: Objectives of the IAWG Team Visit to South Africa:

A team from the Interagency Working Group on International Exchanges and Training visited South Africa in April, 1999, to obtain a field perspective on the international exchange and training programs being reported by Washington headquarters. The visit to South Africa provided an opportunity to learn about a Binational Commission; verify the accuracy of the program inventories provided in Washington; determine the level of in-country coordination and information sharing on exchanges and training programs; examine programs for complementarity, synergy, duplication and/or overlap; identify administrative and programmatic "best practices" related to exchanges and training as described by program officers, mission colleagues, and host-country contacts; identify performance measurement standards; observe the degree of host country input into exchanges and training program operations; learn about private sector initiatives and the degree of support solicitations receive in-country by United States Government agencies conducting exchanges and training; and collect suggestions from U.S. Mission staff regarding the strategy and action plan (for 10 percent savings recommendations) for the Interagency Working Group on International Exchanges and Training's *FY 1998 Annual Report*. This report is structured around these goals.

Introduction

The Executive Committee of the Interagency Working Group on International Exchanges and Training decided that visits to selected countries would foster a better understanding of Washington-based reports on U.S. Government exchange and training programs undertaken in foreign countries. It requested that one of the visits be to a country in which a Binational Commission is in place. South Africa met that criterion. In addition, South Africa, which has hosted more than a score of U.S. agency programs, offered a Southern Hemisphere, African, and developing-world perspective. The U.S. Embassy requested that the visit take place well before the June 2, 1999, elections in South Africa.

The six-member visiting team consisted of representatives from the Department of State (team leader), Department of Education, Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the IAWG staff. The five agency representatives divided up among themselves the responsibility for the twenty-six agencies which had reported programs involving South Africa in 1997. Each member endeavored to contact knowledgeable persons in his/her assigned agencies' Washington headquarters prior to departure. This turned out to be especially important for those agencies without a staff assigned in-country to South Africa. Such agency programs generally involved the training of South Africans in the United States. For those programs, agency headquarters contacts are as likely to have been made directly with South African Government counterparts as through an Embassy officer.

The Embassy assigned its Public Affairs Officer to provide on-site support to the team. He and his staff, especially the Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, gave unstintingly of their time, office space, computer equipment, and advice. They arranged key appointments before the team arrived. As the team identified other programs and people of interest, the Embassy arranged additional appointments or telephone connections. In general, cooperation was excellent; some offices initially hesitated to cooperate until the team clarified the reason for the visit. A strong reluctance to assist surfaced only once and appeared to be due to limited knowledge of the programs being discussed. Insufficient time prevented the team from visiting program contacts outside the Pretoria/Johannesburg area.

Upon their return from South Africa, team members continued contacting Washington headquarters to gather additional information and to verify information obtained in the field. The team had learned that some program control officers in South Africa did not know the technical details of exchange and training programs managed from Washington. In many cases, Washington contacts from agencies without in-country program representation in South Africa knew little or nothing about the programs being implemented.

Overview of the United States-South Africa Binational Commission

Most international exchanges and training programs the United States Government conducts in or with South Africa are on-going intergovernmental projects. Beginning in 1994, however, a new high profile undertaking (the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission) entered the picture and generated far more publicity and Embassy staff attention than would be expected from an endeavor that brought no monies with it.

Under the leadership of U.S. Vice President Albert Gore and then-South African Deputy President (now President) Thabo Mbeki, the United States and South Africa are building a broad, deep, and balanced U.S.- South African partnership through the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission. Founded under the leadership of President Bill Clinton and then-President Nelson Mandela during the South African leader's State Visit to Washington in 1994, the Binational Commission was inaugurated on March 1, 1995, to:

- Promote the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa through a working partnership at the highest levels of government;
- Launch a new era in cooperation between the two countries by establishing permanent and vigorous institutional partnerships;
- Identify U.S. expertise to assist South Africa in meeting its Reconstruction and Development Program goals and to explore areas for cooperation based on shared values and experiences;
- Build upon and expand the involvement of both private investors and non-government

organizations in strengthening U.S.- South Africa ties.

The U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission seeks to develop a new partnership through committees in eight areas of mutual interest to both nations: Agriculture; Conservation, Environment and Water; Defense; Human Resources Development and Education; Justice and Anti-Crime Cooperation; Science and Technology; Sustainable Energy; and Trade and Investment. Senior U.S. and South African government officials jointly chair the eight working committees. Each committee acts to identify and achieve clear, mutually beneficial objectives, and to promote strong partnerships with private companies and non-government organizations in committee activities. While working committees schedule their own meetings and projects throughout the year, the full Binational Commission gathers in plenary session every six months (at least through mid-1999) to report to Vice President Gore and President Mbeki on the progress of specific projects and to discuss areas for further cooperation. The venue for the regular plenary sessions alternates between the United States and South Africa. (Mr. Mbeki's elevation to President and Mr. Gore's focus on the 2000 election may alter the Commission's leadership in the future.)

The Binational Commission does not substitute nor supplant normal bilateral diplomatic, political, economic, trade, or people-to-people ties. Instead, it seeks to underscore the shared mutual interests of both nations in supporting and expanding these ties, with the help of government leaders at the highest levels.

The high-profile nature of the Binational Commission leadership contributed to the creation and/ or increase of international exchanges and training programming by agencies that had not previously focused on South Africa. It also generated some innovative interagency operations at the Embassy level. At the same time, the Commission seeks ways to accomplish what Vice President Gore and then-Deputy President Mbeki promised in 1995. The need for innovative programming arises because: (a) no additional money has been appropriated to fund Binational Commission projects, (b) project ideas arrive from many sources, (c) committee-Embassy liaison is ad hoc in nature though each committee has a designated Embassy contact person, (d) many technical projects progress with little or no Embassy knowledge, (e) budget transfers are made at both the Embassy and Washington Department levels, (f) costs not directly covered by budget transfer grants are micromanaged, (g) having funds and program management resources in different agencies contributes to inefficiencies, (h) every project approved by the co-chaired committee must then be approved by the South African Government.

The team was unable to gather complete information on all Binational Commission projects from the U.S. Embassy. While information can be collected about projects handled by agencies with representatives at the Embassy, such as USAID, USIA, Agriculture, Defense, and Commerce; but for several agencies, including Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Transportation, most communication appears to occur directly between the U.S.-based project managers and their South African Government counterparts. The Economic Office of the Embassy, a designated contact on many Binational Commission projects, often knows of projects as they begin, but is not informed about subsequent activities on a consistent basis. The Embassy may not be aware of project-related travel to South Africa since country clearance is required only for United States

Government employees. The details of how such projects are funded are not routinely passed through the Embassy.

For the twenty-five percent of the Binational Commission projects that USAID funds, USIS South Africa handles most of the project management responsibilities as specified under an interagency agreement. USIS contributes its own staff time and equipment, but gets reimbursed for the remainder of the costs (usually travel and per diem). Since the beginning of the Binational Commission's operations, USAID has obligated \$2,182,622 to fund Binational Commission projects.

OMB's REIMBURSABLE ACCOUNT

Congress insists that foreign operations be overseen by foreign affairs agencies and appropriates funds accordingly. Thus, budget transfers from 150 account agencies (which includes those agencies that are involved with international affairs) to domestic agencies which have the personnel and experience to operate the foreign operations commonly occur. See Chapter 2 for more background on budget transfers. In the past, block grants enabled funds to be passed from one agency to another. More recently, however, to facilitate closer control over the operations, 150 account agencies require the implementing agencies, after the interagency agreement is signed, to "Afront" the program costs for later reimbursement. With small low-cost programs, this does not create a hardship. But, with larger programs that could cost millions, it does. A process developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides a solution: the reimbursable account. The following description illustrates how this process works for USAID and USIA:

USAID obligates funds for later transfer to USIA Washington via an interagency agreement (IAA) negotiated between USAID South Africa and USIS South Africa. The IAA serves as an obligating document to lock in fiscal year funds for use until the grant is completed; completion of the grant need not happen in the fiscal year of the obligation. Using an OMB reimbursement account that provides funds over and above USIA's appropriated funds, USIA Washington advances funds to the USIS South Africa account. USIA Washington gets reimbursement from USAID Washington after USIS South Africa completes a project.

As a fiscal year nears an end, USIS South Africa must return to USIA any unspent advanced funds. Even though the funds have been obligated and thus freed of fiscal year-end worries, they would be lost if left in an active account. To conserve the funds, the post must return them to USIA for recrediting to the OMB reimbursement account. With the start of a new fiscal year, USIA Washington forwards additional money from the OMB account to the USIS South Africa account, continuing the funding of existing grants.

With Binational Commission operations unsupported by a sustainable funding and programming infrastructure, the team concluded that the future of the Commission is in jeopardy. Some noteworthy problems include the following:

(a) Binational Commission-inspired projects currently in operation completely depend on existing fiscal and management resources. The team found no evidence that any agency has requested additional funds from Congress for any fiscal year, including FY 1999, to fund Binational Commission activities.

(b) The expansion of Binational Commission committees will produce projects based on existing funds. But a mechanism to set priorities of these projects has not been developed.

(c) The inspiration for the Binational Commission flows from two individuals (Gore and Mbeki) who have increasingly less time to devote to this effort. Moreover, secondary U.S. support from Cabinet Secretaries has been more personal than institutional.

(d) Until there is bipartisan support expressed through Congressional appropriations, the Binational Commission is potentially vulnerable to the U.S. national political picture. (The existence of the Commission appears to be heavily dependent upon Vice President Gore's interest in it.)

(e) There currently is no formal incorporation of Binational Commission initiatives into the Mission Program Plan (MPP) process. Binational Commission matters should be integrated into the MPP, especially so as to address funding for the Binational Commission and related forward-looking objectives and initiatives.

Verify the FY 1997 and 1998 inventory of exchanges and training programs:

In general, the team found it difficult to confirm inventory numbers with Embassy personnel, especially for agencies without in-country representatives (e.g., Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Institute of Peace, Federal Emergency Management Agency). The inventory information provided by in-country representatives, even for large programs like AID and the Department of Defense, differed from the information reported by the Washington offices. In several instances, even headquarters personnel were unable to confirm the numbers reported to the IAWG. USIS was the exception; its numbers actually matched the numbers reported by USIA headquarters.

In view of the problems, the team had the following observations and conclusions:

1. Embassy personnel, as well as IAWG team members, felt uncertain about which programs to count and how to count them. For example: Where do consultants fit in? Is a single U.S. trainer sent to three countries counted three times? Where regional training is involved, must the site country participants be subtracted from the training count? Who is responsible for reporting program participation, the funding agency or the implementing agency?

2. The IAWG definition of exchanges and training should be broadened to include distance learning programs. Also, the team thinks that when South African students are trained in-country by U.S. trainers, the students should be counted as part of the U.S. international training effort, even though they do not cross international borders themselves.

3. Binational Commission program data may or may not be included in IAWG data. The difficulty stems from the transfer of funds between agencies at the field level and the fact that the actual programming may be done in the United States by an agency not represented in South Africa. In the field, it is impossible to verify the extent to which participant figures provided by Washington agency headquarters include Binational Commission projects implemented in the United States and funded through interagency agreements. The following scenarios add to or create confusion:

a. Programming done in South Africa under interagency agreements may not be included in the IAWG inventories;

b. South African nationals sent to the United States for training or programming under interagency agreements may be double-counted or, we suspect, missed entirely;

c. South African nationals sent outside South Africa -- but not to the United States -- under interagency agreements are clearly not always counted.

4. MPP-based figures cannot be considered 100 percent accurate because they often are missing vital Washington data.

5. Science and technology project data were not verifiable in the field, in part, because the team did not have sufficient time to visit with local South African Government contacts who would be familiar with these projects.

6. With no systemic record keeping procedures in place, personnel in the same office frequently gave different counts for the same programs. Various record keeping procedures sometimes resulted in personnel in the same office providing different counts for the same programs.

7. Washington headquarters fail to provide clear guidance to the field on reporting requirements. Or, they operate with different definitions of the type of exchanges which should be reported. This problem worsens where Washington programmers deal directly with host country principals without Embassy involvement. Agencies whose field representatives do not reside in South Africa are not in a position to resolve this problem.

Level of in-country coordination and information-sharing with attention to duplication, complementary, synergy, and/or overlap:

The high level of communication within the Embassy impressed the team. This contrasted sharply with

the team's impressions of Washington-based coordination of international exchanges and training programs in South Africa. Collocation is a significant factor, of course, but Pretoria also has five excellent mechanisms to assure a high level of interagency coordination and minimize program duplication and overlap:

1. A South African official and an American official co-chair each of the eight Binational Commission's committees. Proposed projects from whatever source are directed to the appropriate committee. A committee's approved projects must first be approved by the South African Government and then given to the Embassy officer who liaises with the committee. That officer then transmits the project to the U.S. Government agency/department that has the relevant expertise and is prepared to accept it. Since the process is transparent at the initiation stage, agencies avoid duplication and can easily complement with exchange and training projects in their own programs. This mitigates the fact that the executive functions of the South African Government do not mirror those of the U.S. Government.
2. All U.S. Government projects in the area of law enforcement must be presented to the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG), which is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission and coordinated by the Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs representative in the Embassy. The LEWG reviews the projects to avoid overlap, identifies coverage gaps, and makes sure that all agencies involved know about their fellow members' activities.
3. The traditional interagency International Visitors committee at post selects candidates for USIA exchange grants. While this committee is involved with less than a quarter of the total country grants, it could well be expanded to provide a single clearinghouse for Embassy grants. This would avoid the duplicative effort described by the director of the African-American Institute, USAID's contract organization which processes candidates for USAID's ATLAS scholarship program. She indicated that, without a clearinghouse, a person who applies for a scholarship from more than one U.S. agency may be accepted by two or more programs, wasting time and effort when the candidate can only be recruited for one. The other programs must renew their efforts to seek out other suitable candidates.
4. USAID, through a USAID-USIS cooperative arrangement intended to further the USAID strategic objective of democracy and governance, provides what it calls transition support funds (TSF). USIS, USAID, or other Embassy elements propose projects for TSF funding. Once the designated USAID officer approves the project, USIS implements it using the same OMB mechanism described earlier for the Binational Commission project reimbursements. Since FY 1995, USAID has spent a total of \$2,450,000 in TSF funds.
5. The country team, which manages the MPP, meets weekly under the supervision of the Ambassador.

Duplication problems arise chiefly when Washington-based offices bypass the Embassy and work directly with their counterparts in the South African Government. When this involves programs that cover the same goals being addressed by that agency's in-country programmers, the result may be duplication or overlap within the same agency. USAID South Africa reported encountering this problem.

When this involves programs that cover the same goals being addressed by another agency program in South Africa, whether run from the Embassy or Washington, the result is confusion for the South Africans in addition to duplication of U.S. programming efforts.

The team suspects that the problem stems from the fact that of the 26 agencies having international exchanges and/or training programs in South Africa, only nine have resident officers at the Embassy. As noted earlier, Washington manages many smaller-scale programs, including the Binational Commission's technical projects. Although field representatives usually require clearance of any trip to post, that procedure is more of a logistical convenience than a programming checkpoint. Agencies without representatives and whose travelers do not require Embassy services do not request country clearances.

In addition, there may occasionally be projects "Aearmarked" by Congress or, in the larger agencies, initiated at a level accustomed to working with the international division that involves South Africa but are not coordinated with projects initiated at the Embassy level.

Finally, the team learned that the use of retired non-federal law enforcement officers as trainers undermines the opportunity to build U.S.-South African on-the-job networking and counterpart relationships. The team heard some suggestions that active federal personnel could in some cases be more useful. Additionally, some law enforcement and South African military exchangees are taking "Aearly out" packages as these institutions downsize. This minimizes the usefulness of their training.

Identify administrative and programmatic "best practices" related to exchanges and training from program officers, mission colleagues, and host-country contacts:

The team identified the following "Abest practices" among the U.S. programs in South Africa. (However, the team realized that its limited time and area of focus restricted its ability to examine the issue in greater depth.)

1. The Deputy Chief of Mission chairs the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG). This group makes certain that agencies involved in supporting the rule of law and administration of justice know about all of the programs planned and in operation in that specialization. The aim is to promote coordination, avoid duplication and unproductive overlap, and avoid gaps in coverage.
2. USAID recognizes that other agencies may be better equipped than it to fulfill certain programming goals. Thus, in some instances, USAID provides funds for those agencies to use in developing or executing various projects. In South Africa, USAID began "Acontracting out" its programming requirements in 1991. Since then it has refined its techniques to include authorization for the "Acontractor" to use a percentage of the funds to cover administrative costs. The team learned that some "Acontractors" complain that USAID occasionally micromanages the process. So, further refinement is expected.
3. Programs created for South Africa are sometimes shared with neighboring countries who receive few

resources from the United States Government. U.S. Ambassador Peterson noted, for example, that a Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) team conducted a court martial workshop in Lesotho for Ministry of Justice personnel, including the Attorney General. The DIILS team had been brought to South Africa by the Department of Defense's E-IMET (Expanded International Military Education and Training) unit, a program funded by the Department of State. The Lesotho Government decided that some of the protagonists in the 1998 attempted military coup would have to be court martialled; however, Lesotho had not held a court martial since 1986, and was pleased to be able to obtain help from the U.S. team. Moreover, most representatives of the U.S. law enforcement agencies have regional responsibilities. A regional purview, usually encompassing most of sub-Saharan Africa, enables them to conduct training programs in neighboring countries on a selected basis and conduct larger programs for multi-country regional audiences.

4. The OMB-developed reimbursement account removes the pressure on the appropriated funds of an agency handling programs for another agency under an interagency agreement for which costs are to be reimbursed rather than covered by budget transfer. Since the beginning of the Binational Commission operations, USAID has obligated \$2,182,622 for such projects. This is a sizeable amount of money to be "Afronted," and then to await reimbursement.

5. The Department of Defense's International Military Education Training Mobile Education Teams (MET) are cost effective. The cost of the team's travel to South Africa is much less than the cost would be for sending large numbers of South Africans to the United States for the same training. The Lesotho example cited above involved a MET.

6. USAID's Mandela Scholars program increases its chances of success by recruiting early so that there is plenty of time for orientation both in South Africa and in the U.S. before academic study begins. This orientation includes group training sessions, careful matching with American families in South Africa (before departure) for mentoring purposes, and a 10-week training program at the Economics Institute in Boulder, Colorado, before the scholars reach their university training site.

7. Instead of assuming that the results of U.S.-designed training based on generic requirements will be suitable for South Africa, the U.S. Department of Labor brings South African officials to the United States to review the curriculum to ensure that the results of the training will be relevant to South Africa.

8. USAID has a "Binding" contract for its Mandela Scholars which requires the participants to return to their recruitment university following their U.S. training. While the United States is not in a position to directly enforce such a contract, the contract does provide some leverage to the employing university and upon scholars who may expect further U.S. funded grants.

Identify performance measurement standards within exchanges and training programs:

Only USIS and USAID officers were reasonably aware of the performance measurement standards and requirements as they appear to provide micro-performance measurement of activities/events. Otherwise, the team found no formal or systematic performance measurement of programs. The absence of focus on performance measurement in the MPP process was consistent with the team's findings for most programs. The team met no one who had received training in performance measurement or in the development of standards on which to base it.

The team confirmed in South Africa what they learned in Washington before departure: programs funded through budget transfers or reimbursements typically are not subject to performance measurement. This was particularly evident in the context of the LEWG and member agencies whose programs are primarily funded through budget transfers. Transferee agencies do not have a direct mandate for their programming and lack the resources required to produce detailed reports. In general, ignorance of the concept behind performance measurement, as contrasted with program evaluation, seems to be widespread.

For the most part, field personnel did not know whether programs operated from Washington headquarters were being measured by Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) standards.

Observe the degree of host country input into exchanges and training program operations:

The involvement of the South African Government and South African organizations in the development and operation of the U.S. Government's international exchanges and training programs is broad and deep, perhaps best illustrated by the Binational Commission. As noted earlier, each Binational Commission project must be pre-approved by the appropriate South African Ministry. There are several other examples of collaboration, as detailed below:

1. The Fulbright Commission is completely binational. The South African Government provides an office and pays local salaries; half the Fulbright Board is South African; and the Executive Director is South African.
2. Peace Corps volunteers, who focus solely on secondary education, form partnerships with communities and local and national government agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Education) on projects of local interest, e.g., AIDs, child abuse, and the environment.
3. Candidates for Department of Justice law enforcement training programs tend to be unilaterally selected by the South African Police Service. While these programs are conducted in close consultation with South African authorities, they are necessarily constricted by the interests of the U.S. funding agencies. The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, for example, primarily funds only customs training and exchanges that focus on drug interdiction.
4. The Department of Agriculture solicits its Cochran Program candidates from a wide spectrum of private voluntary organizations as well as the South African Ministry of Agriculture.

5. South African counterparts have considerable influence on setting USAID/South Africa's program objectives, goals, and categories of participants in exchange programs.
6. The National Science Foundation programs to promote scientific education and research capacity building in South Africa are conducted in close collaboration with the Foundation for Research Development.
7. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division jointly provide short-term technical assistance to the South African Competition Commission based largely on South African-defined priorities and needs.

Learn about private sector initiatives and the degree of support solicitations receive in-country by United States Government agencies conducting exchanges and training:

Very little private sector support exists for United States Government international exchanges and training programs in South Africa. Some agencies, like the Peace Corps, have plans to engage the private sector, including non-government organizations. As of 1998, however, the only substantial involvement has been the USAID underwriting of \$175 million of private U.S. lenders to South African financial institutions. The African-American Institute straddles the issue by working as a contractor for USAID while maintaining its private initiatives in the South African community.

Collect suggestions from U.S. Mission staff regarding the strategy and action plan (for 10 percent savings recommendations) for the Interagency Working Group on International Exchanges and Training FY-1998 Annual Report:

Except for two minor suggestions -- that Cochran participants pay their own airfare for 1999 and that U.S. universities provide more cost-sharing support for exchange students -- the U.S. Mission staff offered no recommendations for cost savings. On the contrary, the staff pointed out that because many of the United States Government programs in South Africa were new the course of South African development will necessitate continued expansion of U.S. programs.

The IAWG team, however, suggest the following possible opportunities for savings:

First, centralize the administration of U.S. degree scholarship grants.

Second, coordinate the Binational Commission programs at the Washington level to strengthen the interagency aspect of programs and allow for performance measurement.

And third, expand use of distance learning to reduce travel and per diem costs.

Conclusions:

Based on their visit to South Africa, the IAWG team members offer the following conclusions to lend insight into U.S. training and exchange programs and to guide any future studies in other countries:

1. One week is insufficient time to explore any more than the immediate Embassy staff resources and the largest programs.
2. Field personnel are little interested in the source and evaluation of macro-programming. Their interests tend to lie in the operation of the programs.
3. Frequent discrepancies were found in field participant counts and Washington program inventories.
4. The Embassy was unaware of many programs reported in Washington by agencies without field representatives. These programs are often Washington-based training operations coordinated directly with South African counterpart institutions with little or no Embassy involvement.
5. Where funding sources and program implementation responsibilities lie with different agencies, performance measurement is not occurring on a routine basis.
6. The Binational Commission concept is excellent, but its lifespan is uncertain because it has no appropriated budget or Washington-based staff.
7. Field-level synergy works when the Deputy Chief of Mission oversees interagency coordination.
8. South Africa's prominence in Southern Africa gives it a natural advantage for hosting U.S.-sponsored multinational U.S. international exchanges and training programs.
9. The degree of South African Government input into designing exchange and training programs is greatest when programs are planned at the field level.
10. Private initiative material and financial support from South African sources is rare.
11. Cost savings are likely to come only from direct program curtailment or elimination. Some savings can result from centralization of logistics, but these will be overtaken as new programs mature and expand.
12. The idea of encouraging more U.S. universities to carry more of the costs for long-term training at times meets with resistance from some South Africans. This stems from the fact that internationally

famous U.S. universities are less likely to reduce their costs than lesser known schools and, given a choice, some South Africans would rather return with a degree from the former.

13. A single clearinghouse or interagency committee for all Embassy grants would enhance efficiency and ensure that duplication and missed opportunities are kept to a minimum.

14. For future trips, at least those with more lead time, IAWG sherpas should be encouraged to communicate to the agency field programmers the nature and purpose of IAWG country studies. This would increase field representatives' understanding of the IAWG and therefore make field studies more time-efficient.

15. The IAWG definition of exchange and training should be broadened to include distance learning programs. The team also feels that when U.S. trainers train host-country students in-country, these students, though not crossing international borders themselves, should be considered as part of the U.S. international training effort. (USAID does not agree with this conclusion, citing the inordinate amount of time and cost that would be required to collect and analyze such input data, as compared with the data's usefulness in supporting the Mission Performance Plan and overall performance results. Moreover, in some instances it will be impossible to collect data on in-country training of trainer events as they take place far removed from a monitoring site.)

16. The "best practices" noted earlier should be brought to the attention of Washington programmers for possible applications to other programs.